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The Bank of England is a uniquely powerful, influential and secretive institution, and
in this inside account of the Bank, Dan Conaghan draws on interviews with senior
Bank staff, shedding new light on the Bank’s role in the financial crisis. With its depth
of source material and accessible style, Alastair Hill finds that Conaghan’s recent
history of the Bank is timely, informative, and highly readable.
The Bank: Inside the Bank of  England. Dan Conaghan. Biteback. February 2012.
The central thesis of  Dan Conaghan’s recent history of  the Bank of  England, ent it led The Bank:
Inside the Bank of England, is that  the character of  the Bank and its Governor are very much
intertwined. In part icular, Conaghan asserts that it  is the outgoing Governor Sir Mervyn King who
was at  the heart  of  many of  the Bank’s recent failures. Tracing his ascent to the Bank’s top role,
Conaghan charts King’s humble upbringing in the Black Country, through his academic career and
his subsequent, if  somewhat reluctant, move into central banking. The suggest ion throughout is
that King’s more theoret ical and purist  approach would have been better suited to academia,
rather than the more applied world of  central banking.
Conaghan describes how King developed strong intellectual af f init ies with monetary economics,
as well as the theory of  moral hazard. With lit t le interest  in the day-to-day workings of  f inancial
markets or the supervision of  the f inance companies and banks, which he saw as ‘irresponsible,
greedy and irredeemably short-termist ’, King’s governorship saw him further withdraw the Bank
from pract ical central banking towards his own more academic economic interests.
Conaghan also highlights that King was given a signif icant push in this direct ion when New Labour
granted the Bank independence with the sole remit  to focus on monetary policy. Much to King’s
delight , supervision of  the f inancial sector and the banks was moved to the newly created
Financial Services Authority, management of  the public purse remained the responsibility of  the
Treasury and together they formed the new ‘Tripart ite System’.
With King now free to follow the academic interests he developed so keenly over his career,
focusing exclusively on monetary policy and long-term f inancial stability, the Bank paid increasingly
less at tent ion to the act ivity of  the City. It  was this shif t  in emphasis that Conaghan suggests was
ult imately and brutally exposed during the period 2007-2012.
In the second sect ion of  the book, Conaghan charts in rigorous detail the series of  f inancial crises
that faced the Bank during this period, including it ’s much crit icised handling of  the Northern Rock
debacle. Having recent ly suggested that ‘he did not shout loud enough’ about the excessive risks
building up in the f inancial system Conaghan goes further and also highlights that as late as
August 2007 King was st ill saying that he saw increased securit isat ion in the f inancial sector ‘as no
bad thing’.
Yet while King may be excused for not foreseeing the extent of  the crises to come, Conaghan
makes clear in no uncertain terms that King’s rigidity of  intellectual perspect ive which led him to
preside over the Bank’s woefully inadequate response to a series of  crises.
Conaghan’s crit icism is not reserved solely for King however, and he uses the minutes of  the
proceedings of  the Treasury Select  Commit tee to expose the failures in communicat ions at  the
heart  of  the t ripart ite, King was of ten at  the heart  of  this as a result  of  his failure to not devote
enough at tent ion to developments in the f inancial markets. One anecdote is part icularly instruct ive
here. As The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve were making huge liquidity
inject ions to tackle a liquidity crisis following BNP Paribas Investment Partners f reezing their three
investment funds in August 2007, King was instead busy watching England play the West Indies in
the Third Test at  the Oval. King is perhaps spared sole blame for the Northern Rock f iasco a year
later however, when Conaghan highlights Michael Fallon MPs cutt ing quest ion to King during a
Commit tee evidence session of  “so just  who was in charge then?”
Such events have seen the tripart ite system widely discredited, but as Conaghan makes clear it
does not absolve King and the Bank from blame for their handling of  the crisis. Despite this, as
Conaghan points out, ‘in many ways the Bank that will be the main benef iciary of  the crisis’.
His f inal sect ion addresses this fact  that  in 2013 the Bank is set  to be awarded signif icant new
powers f rom the Financial Services Bill current ly making its way through Parliament. In dissolving
the FSA and placing f inancial supervision back in the purview of  the Bank it  is hoped that such
policy failures will not  be repeated. Despite this, having developed the central thesis that Bank and
Governor are so intertwined, it  is perhaps curious that Conaghan fails to provide more crit ical
analysis of  policies which will ult imately see the Bank and its Governor awarded signif icant new
powers with lit t le in the way of  increased accountability. The suggest ion seems to be that much
rides on the character of  the next Governor, with Conaghan suggest ing that the present
Commercial Secretary to the Treasury, Lord Sassoon, could be a likely candidate. If  selected he
would be the f irst  external candidate to become Governor for over 30 years, and with a wealth of
city and f inancial experience he would stand in sharp contrast  to the more academically-minded
King.
Perhaps what is most clearly absent in Conaghan’s work though is more crit ical analysis of  the
economic theories which underpinned the Bank’s approach. In crit icising King’s overly academic
approach, we are lef t  with the dist inct  impression that economic theory has lit t le to of fer in the
pract ical world of  modern f inancial markets. This wholesale reject ion of  theory is perhaps troubling.
Clearly the monetarist  fundamentalism and “ef f icient  markets” theories which had been in vogue
since the 1980’s, and favoured by the Bank, have been much discredited by recent events. Yet the
trend by many policy commentators now is to assert  that  what the crisis has taught policy-makers
is to reject  economic theory pret ty much altogether as it  is not applicable to pract icalit ies of
modern f inance. Conaghan seems to buy into this suggest ion, yet  clearly there must also be an
argument that the authorit ies were simply seduced by the wrong ideas. Indeed, the theory that
Conaghan’s work reserves strongest crit icism for is King’s lifelong commitment to moral hazard.
On the one hand Conaghan is right  to crit icise King’s steadfast  emphasis on moral hazard theory,
even when faced by a full-blown crisis, and as a result  he saw the Bank delay much needed act ion.
However, the fact  remains that moral hazard is a signif icant problem in the f inancial sector, albeit  a
long term structural issue, rather than a guide for short  term crisis management.
Conaghan’s lack of  crit ical depth is also dist inct ly apparent in his chapter on the Bank’s
Quant itat ive Easing (QE) programme. While he describes the ‘paradox of  policy’, his analysis is very
much based on the pract ical mechanics of  QE, part icularly on how the Bank actually went about
buying such huge numbers of  gilts and how it  led to an upsurge in failed t rades, as well as on the
legality of  the scheme. His suggest ion that it  is a scheme which ‘will likely preoccupy economics
professors and PhD students for years to come’ seems unsat isfactory given the current intensity
of  live debate.
However, Conaghan’s work here should not be overlooked. While looking for more rigorous
economic analysis of  the Bank’s recent history may wish to read on, newcomers to the literature
and those seeking an enjoyable and engaging read interspersed with anecdotes will not
be disappointed. Many anecdotes and stories will stay with the reader, not least  Eddie George’s
quip that he was going to Truro being overheard by a journalist  who recorded it  as ‘we’re going to
leave the Euro’, as well as details of  Sir Mervyn King’s perhaps unlikely f riendship with ex-Aston
Midf ielder Thomas ‘the Hammer’ Hitzelsperger. With its depth of  source material and high quality
of  analysis dealing with a highly secret ive and complex inst itut ion, Conaghan’s recent history of
the Bank is t imely, informat ive, and highly readable.
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